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Abstract: The latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by debates in
evolutionary biology over the relative significance of natural selection and random drift:
the so-called “neutralist/selectionist” debates.  Yet John Beatty has argued that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept of
natural selection, a claim that has been accepted by many philosophers of biology.  If this
claim is correct, then the neutralist/selectionist debates seem at best futile, and at worst,
meaningless.  I reexamine the issues that Beatty raises, and argue that random drift and
natural selection, conceived as processes, can be distinguished from one another.
Key words: Beatty, Brandon, Carson, Hodge, causal relevance, chance, conceptual
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1. Introduction.
The role of random drift in twentieth century evolutionary biology has been a turbulent
one.  Biologists such as Wright and Fisher disagreed over the relative importance of
random drift in the evolutionary process, with Fisher arguing that Wright’s theory
assigned too great a role to random drift.  The debate continues today, with “neutralists”
such as Kimura and Crow claiming an even larger role for random drift than Wright did,
while “selectionists” such as Ernst Mayr and Douglas Futuyma (see especially Mayr
1983 and Futuyma 1988) remain steadfast to the idea that it is natural selection that plays
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the preeminent role in phenotypic evolution.  According to the selectionist camp, the role
of random drift is at best a minor one.  As Beatty (1984) argues, this debate has taken
place in specific contexts (over whether, for example, natural selection or random drift is
more prevalent in a particular population) as well as more general contexts (over whether
natural selection or random drift is more prevalent as a whole).
With all this contention concerning the relative importance of random drift and
natural selection within evolution, one would hope that the concepts of random drift and
natural selection could be defined and distinguished clearly.  After all, if one is to argue
that random drift is very prevalent in evolution, and natural selection less so (or vice
versa), it had better be the case that instances of natural selection can be distinguished
from instances of random drift – and in order to do that, he concepts must be distinct.
Even (or perhaps, especially) if one takes a non-empirical, theoretical approach to settling
this debate, it is still necessary that one be able to distinguish the concept of random drift
from the concept of natural selection.  However, Beatty (1984) argues that it is not easy –
perhaps even impossible – to distinguish the two concepts.  But if that is true, then it
seems as though the neutralist/selectionist debate has just been a tempest in a teapot, and
that participants in the debate have been arguing about nothing.
Perhaps they have been.  However, it is incumbent upon philosophers of biology to
try to clarify debates within biology such as these, if possible.  It is with this motivation
that I seek to reexamine the questions that the debate presupposes.  What is random drift?
Can it be distinguished from natural selection?  In addressing these questions I will not,
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however, take a stance on the neutralist/selectionist debate itself, an issue best left to
biologists.
First, I characterize random drift and natural selection, both as processes and as
outcomes.  Then I turn to the question of whether random drift can be distinguished from
natural selection.  Using the characterization of random drift and natural selection that I
developed earlier, I argue that the concepts of natural selection and random drift are
distinct as processes, if not as outcomes.  Lastly, I consider an alternative characterization
of natural selection and random drift, due to Brandon and Carson (1996), that implies the
same conclusion I reach but for different reasons.  I argue that the account I have
presented is the preferable one.
2. Random Drift and Natural Selection: Processes and Outcomes.
The term ‘random drift’ actually refers to a number of distinct processes, not just one
kind of process, although the different processes have characteristics in common.  Beatty
(1992) isolates four kinds of random drift: indiscriminate parent sampling, indiscriminate
gamete sampling,1 the founder effect, and fluctuations in the rates of evolutionary
processes (selection, migration, and mutation).  The founder effect is similar to another
phenomenon, known as the bottleneck effect.  Another kind of random drift is the random
assortment of genes into gametes (Dodson and Dodson 1985, 229).  Brandon and Carson
(1996) claim that Brandon (1990) identifies yet another “drift-like phenomenon.”  This
leaves potentially at least seven different kinds of random drift.  I say “potentially”
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because there has been some controversy as to which processes should be considered
random drift (Beatty 1992).  Indeed, different authors will describe different subsets of
this list as constituting the different kinds of random drift processes.  For reasons of
space, I will discuss only two of these processes: indiscriminate parent sampling and the
bottleneck effect.  The discussion of different kinds of random drift illustrates the general
characteristics of random drift and focuses attention on the biological basis for random
drift.  I will also contrast random drift with natural selection in relatively straightforward
situations, saving the more complex cases for later discussion.
Parent sampling, according to Beatty, is “the process of determining which organisms
of one generation will be parents of the next, and how many offspring each parent will
have” (1984, 188; italics in original).  According to Beatty, this parent sampling can be
discriminate, that is, with regard to fitness differences, or indiscriminate, that is, without
regard to fitness differences (1984, 189).  Discriminate parent sampling is generally
considered natural selection; indiscriminate parent sampling is random drift.
But what is sampling “with regard to fitness differences” and sampling “without
regard to fitness differences”?  A hypothetical example will help to clarify.  Suppose a
population of gray and brown squirrels shares its habitat with a colorblind predator.  The
gray squirrels die in greater numbers than the brown squirrels – it just so happens, say,
that more of the gray squirrels are unlucky enough to come into contact with the predator.
Consequently, the frequency of gray squirrels in the next generation is reduced.  More
brown squirrels are “sampled” (i.e., survive to reproduce) than gray squirrels, but it is
without regard to any differences in fitness between the gray squirrels and the brown
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squirrels.  In other words, the physical differences between the two types of squirrels do
not play a causal role in the differences in reproductive success.2  The change in
frequency in this squirrel population is due to the kind of random drift known as
indiscriminate parent sampling.  This contrasts with alternative scenarios in which
physical differences do play a causal role in the differences in reproductive success.
Suppose, for example, that the predator was not colorblind, and that in this particular
environment the predator was able to see the gray squirrels more clearly than the brown
squirrels, causing greater survival of brown squirrels over gray.  This would be a case of
discriminate parent sampling, or natural selection.
A related phenomenon is what is sometimes called the bott neck effect.  A bottleneck
occurs when there is a large reduction in the number of organisms in a population (as
occurs frequently in some populations that tend to fluctuate in size, perhaps in response
to fluctuating environment).  When biologists speak of a bottleneck, they are generally
referring to an indiscriminate sampling process; physical differences between organisms
in the original population are causally irrelevant to differences in reproductive success
that produce the composition of the smaller population.  For example, a severe drought
might devastate a population of artichokes, killing artichokes without regard to
differences in color, size, or shape.  Logically, one could speak of a iscriminate
bottleneck where there was a drastic reduction in population size and where th  physical
differences of some organisms gave them a greater ability to survive and reproduce, but
such a phrase would be misleading.  For example, it is hypothesized that cheetahs
underwent a severe bottleneck at some point during their evolutionary history.  Suppose
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that during this bottleneck, the cheetahs with longer legs had a greater ability to survive
than the cheetahs with shorter legs.  However, while such a discriminate sampling
process  (i.e., selection) might explain why longer-legged cheetahs were in the end more
prevalent, it would not explain why there was an over ll reduction in the number of
cheetahs, both long-legged and short-legged.  In the overall reduction of the population,
organisms are killed indiscriminately.  Thus, biologists seem to prefer to speak of such
cases as natural selection together with random drift (as a bottleneck), rather than as a
discriminate bottleneck.  (We will discuss such an example below.)  The bottleneck effect
is quite similar to indiscriminate parent sampling, since both processes involve sampling
of parents which is indiscriminate with respect to physical differences.  The primary
difference is that with the bottleneck effect, there is a drastic reduction in the size of the
population, whereas with indiscriminate parent sampling, the size of the population may
remain relatively constant from one generation to the next.
The two kinds of random drift that I have discussed here, indiscriminate parent
sampling and indiscriminate bottlenecks, are processes that sample indiscriminately with
respect to physical differences.  That is, they are processes in which any physical
differences are causally irrelevant in the sampling process.  Analogously, the two kinds
of natural selection I discussed, discriminate parent sampling and discriminate sampling
during a bottleneck, are processes that sample discriminately with respect to physical
characteristics, meaning that physical differences are causally relevant in the sampling
process.  Again, the difference has to do with whether population size remains relatively
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constant from one generation to the next (parent sampling), or whether the population is
reduced in size (bottleneck).
 My suggestion that Beatty’s conceptions of “discriminate sampling” and
“indiscriminate sampling” should be spelled out in terms of causal relevance is similar to
Hodge’s (1987) position.  Hodge asserts that a proper distinction between natural
selection and random drift relies on causation: “… differential reproduction in selection
is distinguished from any in drift by its causation; by contrast with drift, it is occurring
because the physical property differences constituting the hereditary variation that is
being differentially reproduced are not merely correlated with differences in reproduction
– they are causally relevant to them” (1987, 251).  Note that Hodge, as is commonly
done, includes heredity as a necessary condition for both natural selection and random
drift.  I am in agreement with Hodge on this point as well, and all physical differences
mentioned in subsequent discussion should be assumed to be heritable.
Beatty’s discussion of random drift as “indiscriminate sampling” and natural selection
as “discriminate sampling” focuses on random drift and natural selection as certain kinds
of processes.  However, it is important to note that while random drift is sometimes
spoken of as a process, at other times it is spoken of as an outcome.  Suppose there were
a population of giraffes not undergoing mutation, migration, or selection – only random
drift.  Again, random drift is an indiscriminate sampling process, i  which physical
differences between organisms are causally irrelevant to their reproductive success.
Thus, if the long-necked giraffes in the population become more prevalent than short-
necked giraffes, it is by chance (and not because of their long necks).  In an infinite (or
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very large) population, we would expect the proportion of long-necked to short-necked
giraffes to remain relatively constant from generation to generation.  However, we would
not expect the proportions to remain constant in a small population.  To understand this,
imagine an urn filled with colored balls where balls are sampled without respect to color.
If a large sample of balls were taken, we would expect the frequencies of colored balls in
the sample to be very close to the frequencies in the urn.  On the other hand, if we only
take a small sample of colored balls, our sample may very well have different proportions
of colored balls than the urn does.  In the same way that the color difference between the
balls is causally irrelevant to which ball gets picked, in a population undergoing the
process of random drift, the physical differences between organisms are causally
irrelevant to differences in their reproductive success.  So in large populations, as with
large urn samples, we would expect gene frequencies to be representative of the parent
generation, but in small populations, as with small urn samples, gene frequencies may or
may not be representative.  Thus, when random drift occurs over a number of generations
in a small population, gene frequencies may fluctuate, or drift, rand mly from generation
to generation.
 However, when we speak of the drifting of gene frequencies in this way we are no
longer focusing on random drift as a certain kind of process (an indiscriminate sampling
process, analogous to sampling balls from an urn).  We are considering random drift as a
certain kind of utcome (an outcome where gene frequencies fluctuate from generation to
generation, in the same way that repeated sampling of balls from an urn would fluctuate
from sample to sample).  Similarly, we might speak of natural selection as a certain kind
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of process (a discriminate sampling process), as well as a certain kind of outcome (an
outcome where the fittest organisms have the greatest reproductive success).3
In distinguishing a process from its outcome, I mean to distinguish the kinds of
changes that occur over time (the process) from the “ending” state that occurs at one
point in time (the outcome).  Of course, in a population undergoing evolution,
designation of an ending state (or a beginning state, for that matter) at any particular point
in time is arbitrary.  To return to the indiscriminate parent sampling example discussed
above, suppose that we (arbitrarily) choose the initial state of the population at a point in
time in which the population is composed of equal numbers of gray and brown squirrels.
The squirrels are exposed to the colorblind predator, causing the population (as described
by the relative proportions of each color of squirrel) to change in a certain kind of way:
the squirrels are sampled indiscriminately with respect to their color.  In other words, the
color difference between the squirrels is causally irrelevant to their survival.  This is an
instance of the process of random drift (more specifically, an instance of indiscriminate
parent sampling).  The end state, or outcome of this process (again, chosen at an arbitrary
point in time), might be that population is composed of 51% brown squirrels and 49%
gray squirrels.  Alternatively, the outcome might be more dramatic – say, 60% brown
squirrels and 40% gray squirrels.  Thus, we may have different outcomes from the same
kind of process; outcome is distinct from process.  The case of the indiscriminate
bottleneck is much the same, except that if there is a severe bottleneck (where the
population is reduced to a very small size), the new population is that much more likely
to experience an outcome which diverges widely from the original population.  The
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reduced population may carry only a small fraction of the variation of the original
population.
In the discussion that follows, I will argue that this distinction between process and
outcome is the key to solving the problem of distinguishing between random drift and
natural selection.
3. Natural Selection and Random Drift: Conceptually Distinct or Not?
We have been discussing random drift and natural selection as processes that occur in
isolation from one another.  However, as Beatty (1984) notes, in any real, finite
population where natural selection is occurring, random drift will be occurring as well.
Thus, we need to be able to identify the different processes and outcomes as they occur in
a population.  Furthermore, as we discussed in section 1, there has been (and continues to
be) a great deal of debate over the question of whether, in particular instances and in
general, natural selection is more prevalent than random drift.  For these reasons, it is
important that the concept of random drift be distinguishable from the concept of natural
selection.  (How one distinguishes natural selection and random drift empirically, as
opposed to c nceptually, is a separate although not unrelated issue.  This will be
discussed further below.)  But can they be so distinguished?
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3.1.  Beatty’s “Chance and Natural Selection” Revisited.
According to Beatty, it is “conceptually difficult to distinguish natural selection from
random drift” (1984, 196).  Again, on Beatty’s account, natural selection is discriminate
sampling, or sampling with regard to fitness differences, whereas random drift is
indiscriminate sampling, or sampling without regard to fitness differences (1984, 190-1).
Yet Beatty maintains that these concepts are not conceptually distinct.
The potential inability to distinguish the concepts of natural selection and random
drift is a problem for evolutionary biology given arguments over the relative importance
of natural selection and random drift.  How can natural selection and random drift be
used as alternative explanations if the concepts of natural selection and random drift
cannot be distinguished?  Beatty suggests that some evolutionary changes are “to some
extent, or in some sense, a matter of natural selection nd to some extent, or in some
sense, a matter of random drift” (1984, 196), acknowledging that, at least in some cases
there is no hard and fast distinction between random drift and natural selection.  This is
not a solution to the problem he has raised, but rather a concession to the problem.
Perhaps this is the best that we can do.  However, I think it is important to try to make
sense of biologists’ empirical claims about whether random drift or natural selection is
more prevalent in given population.  In general, these claims are difficult to substantiate,
but with ambiguous conceptual tools, they are impossible to substantiate.  If Beatty is
right, there will be some cases in which we cannot answer the empirical question because
our concepts are not sufficiently distinct (this is different from, say, not being able to
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answer the question because we can’t obtain the relevant information).  However, if the
concepts are not distinct, then it seems as though all evol tionary explanations that
invoke natural selection and/or random drift will suffer from vagueness, not just certain
fuzzy cases.  My motivation for the following discussion stems from a desire to avoid this
unattractive conclusion.
As noted above, my definitions of natural selection and random drift are consistent
with Beatty’s and are essentially the same as those of Hodge (1987).  Neither Hodge nor
Beatty makes the explicit distinction between process and outcome that I made above,
although both use the distinction implicitly.  Citing Beatty (1984), Hodge states:
… explicating selection by contrast with drift allows for – even encourages – the
admission that in real life the ecology and genetics of butterflies and their predators
may include some changes that are equally plausibly categorized as selection or
drift.  Once one considers such familiar complications as linked genes, correlated
responses to selection, patchy environments, frequency dependent effects, habitat
preferences, and so on, it is possible to think of scenarios for which it is impossible
to draw a sharp line between [differential reproduction where physical property
differences are causally irrelevant and differential reproduction where physical
differences are causally relevant].  But here, as always, it is to be emphasized that
such impossibilities do not nullify the rationales for making the conceptual
distinction (1987, 253).
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This passage may be interpreted as claiming that whereas, empirically, it may be difficult
to classify some outcomes as random drift or natural selection, conceptually, the two are
distinct.  In what follows, I will revisit Beatty’s arguments and use the process/outcome
distinction to argue in support of Hodge’s claim.
Beatty’s conclusions are based on the following example of parent sampling.
Consider a population of dark moths and light moths, both having the same color-
sensitive predator.  The moths inhabit a forest of light colored trees (40%) and dark
colored trees (60%).  The light colored moths are camouflaged against the light colored
trees; the dark moths are camouflaged against the dark colored trees.  Since there are
more dark colored trees than light colored ones, the dark moths have a greater likelihood
of landing on a tree that will prevent their detection by a predator.  Thus, we would
expect the dark colored moths to have greater reproductive success than the light colored
moths.
However, as Beatty emphasizes, the expected reproductive success of each type of
moth (dark or light) can be represented by a probability distribution where the probability
of the given type for leaving each of the possible quantities of offspring is displayed.
Now suppose that: 1) there is an overlap in the probability distributions of the dark and
light moths, such that it is possible for the light moths to have greater actual reproductive
success than the dark moths, even though the dark moths overall have a greater expect d
reproductive success; 2) the possible becomes actual, and the lighter moths do have
greater reproductive success; and 3) the greater actual reproductive success of the lighter
moths is due to the fact that, by chance, the dark moths more frequently landed on light
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colored trees than dark colored trees, despite the fact that there was a greater proportion
of dark colored trees.
Given these three suppositions, Beatty asks: “Is the change in frequency of genes and
genotypes in question a matter of natural selection, or a matter of random drift?  That is,
is the change in question the result of sampling discriminately or indiscriminately with
regard to fitness differences?”  (1984, 195).  Notice that in describing natural selection
and random drift in terms of sampling, the question that Beatty asks concerns natural
selection and random drift as processes.  Let us now examine Beatty’s exploration of
possible answers to this question, keeping in mind the distinction between process and
outcome.
First, Beatty states: “It is not easy to maintain that the sampling was entirely
indiscriminate with regard to differences in survival and reproductive ability” (1984,
195).  Here Beatty is suggesting that we do not want to attribute the changes in the
population entirely to the random drift process.  Beatty does not say why this is, but
presumably, it is because the light moths who perished did so on the basis of their
lightness; the lightness of these moths made them less fit than the darker moths in an
environment where the majority of trees were dark.  In other words, the moths were
sampled discriminately, making the process of random drift implausible as a complete
explanation of the change.  So far, so good.
Beatty then claims: “At least it is difficult to maintain that the death by predation of
conspicuously dark moths in this environment is indiscriminate sampling, whereas the
death of conspicuously light moths in the same environment is selection” (1984, 195).  In
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other words, it seems as though we would want to say that the light moths were sampled
discriminately with regard to their light color and thus, we would say that they were
subject to the process of natural selection.  However, when we consider the dark moths
who died by predation, we might want to say that their deaths occurred indiscriminately
with regard to physical differences4, since it is just by chance that so many of the dark
moths landed on light colored trees.  If the dark moths were “sampled” without regard to
their darkness, we would want to say that they were undergoing the process of random
drift.  But how could it be that the dark moths are undergoing the process of random drift,
while the light moths are undergoing the process of natural selection?  After all, is there
anything that is different about the situations of the two kinds of moth?  In both cases, the
colors of moths that died made the moths distinct against their backgrounds, leaving the
moths vulnerable to the predator.  Why should one case be considered natural selection
and the other random drift?  This answer seems implausible, and Beatty rightly rejects it.
He then suggests that “it is also difficult to maintain that selection alone is the basis of
the change.  At least, it is difficult to maintain that the fittest were selected” (Beatty 1984,
195).  Here lies the crux of the problem.  Note that the former statement refers to the
process of natural selection: the basis of the change.  However, the latter statement refers
to one possible outcome of natural selection: that the fittest were selected.  Yet the
question that Beatty asked, “discriminate sampling or indiscriminate sampling?” was a
question about process, not outcome.
This conflation of process and outcome continues throughout the section.  Beatty
thinks the problem in determining whether the moths exhibit random drift or natural
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selection “is that it is difficult to distinguish between random drift on the one hand, and
the improbable results of natural selection on he other hand (1984, 195-6; italics in
original).  Read “results” as “outcomes.”  Moreover, the conflation persists to Beatty’s
conclusion that it is difficult to distinguish the concept of random drift from the concept
of natural selection:
…it seems that we must say of some evolutionary changes that they are to some
extent, or in some sense, a matter of natural selection nd to some extent, or in
some sense, a matter of random drift.  And the reasons (one of the reasons) we must
say this is that it is conceptually difficult to distinguish natural selection from
random drift, especially where imp obable results of natural selection are
concerned (1984, 196; italics in original).
However, if we consider natural selection and random drift as processes only, the two
concepts can be distinguished in Beatty’s example.  On the one hand, we can identify the
occurrence of the process of natural selection.  The color difference between the light and
the dark moths is causally relevant to the death of the light moths; the light moths died
because the predator could distinguish them more easily than the dark moths in an
environment where there are greater numbers of dark trees (similarly, the dark moths died
in an environment where the predator could distinguish them less easily).  On the other
hand, there is no identifiable process where the physical differences in the population are
causally irrelevant to the differences in reproductive success.  Thus, Beatty’s example is
Are Random Drift and Natural Selection Conceptually Distinct? 17
not a case of the processes of natural selection and random drift together; it is a case of
the process of natural selection alone (with the qualification that since all real populations
are finite, we cannot rule out the possibility of random drift entirely).
Now this might seem like an odd analysis for a population where dark moths are fitter
than light moths, yet light moths are more reproductively successful.  However, once we
consider the reproductive success of the light moths, we are no longer analyzing
processes; we are analyzing the outcome.  So, some might claim that it is odd to say that
an outcome where the fittest do not have the greatest reproductive success is an outcome
of natural selection.  (This seems to be Beatty’s position.)  This is a distinct claim from
what I argued for above, an argument concerning processes.
Nonetheless, I would claim that Beatty’s scenario does describe a natural selection
outcome.  This claim is plausible if we take seriously the proposition that the theory of
natural selection is probabilistic.5  If, as Beatty suggests, the fitness of an organism is
represented by a probability distribution of possible outcomes, then certain outcomes are
more likely than other outcomes, but why should the less likely outcomes be any less
“representative” (to use Beatty’s term) of natural selection than the more likely
outcomes?  All are predicted by natural selection; it is just that the predictions are of
differing strengths.
More tellingly, consider the following: let’s suppose that the population initially
consisted of 50% light moths and 50% dark moths, but in the next generation (after dark
moths unluckily land on too many light trees, and the surviving moths reproduce in equal
numbers) the dark moths are 45% of the population and light moths are 55%.  However,
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since the most likely result (the mean or expected value) is 60% dark moths and 40%
light moths, and since the probability distribution is more or less bell-shaped, the
outcome of 75% dark moths and 25% light moths has nearly the same probability s the
outcome of 45% dark moths and 55% light moths.  Yet, with the latter possibility (75%
dark moths and 25% light moths), where the fitter organisms do have the greater
reproductive success, there is less difficulty in seeing that natural selection is the
operative process.  However, since both results are essentially equally likely, there is no
reason to consider the one outcome (75% dark moths and 25% light moths) to be natural
selection, and the other outcome (45% dark moths and 55% light moths) not to be.
There is a further aspect to consider in evaluating the claim that this is a population
undergoing the process of natural selection.  We are only looking at a change in the
population from one generation of moths to another.  Natural selection, as Darwin
conceived it, is a process which occurs “in the course of many generations” ([1859] 1964,
114).  In the short run, the unlikely can occur (the fittest organisms may be exposed to a
disease, or encounter more predators), so that in the occasional generation, the fittest may
not prevail.  However, in the long run, we would expect the fitter organisms to be more
reproductively successful.  When we consider what would most likely happen to Beatty’s
moth population in succeeding generations, the claim that natural selection has occurred
in the generation in question is more intuitive.
Although I have argued that Beatty’s scenario is largely a case of natural selection,
other scenarios may be analyzed as being cases of natural selection together with random
drift.6  Consider a population of pink and brown snails living in a region where most of
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the surroundings are brown.  In this environment, the brown snails are fitter (and better
adapted) than the pink snails, because the predator which feeds on the snails has a greater
ability to discern the pink snails, giving the pink snails a lower viability.  Now suppose
that one summer there is a drought that causes both brown and pink snails alike to die in
great numbers.  Let us further suppose that more brown snails are able to find moist
shelter and thus survive the drought than pink snails (and that the brownness of the brown
snails is causally unrelated to their greater ability to find shelter).  Consequently, the next
generation of snails includes more brown snails than pink snails.  Again, we can ask
whether this is a case of natural selection or random drift in order to determine whether
the concepts are distinct.  I would argue that with respect to process, the concepts are
distinct.
In the snail population, there is a process in which the physical difference between the
snails is causally irrelevant to the difference in their reproductive success: this is the
(indiscriminate parent sampling) process whereby drought has produced an unusual
shortage of shelter, causing the death of pink and brown snails alike.  Thus, the process of
random drift is occurring in the population.  However, there is also a process in which the
heritable physical difference between the snails is caus lly relevant to the difference in
their reproductive success: some of the pink snails die because they are more easily
picked out by the predator in a largely brown environment.  So, a discriminate parent
sampling process, natural selection, is occurring in the population as well.  Thus, we can
distinguish the concepts of natural selection and random drift, at least with regard to
process, even when applied to a population in which both processes are occurring.
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Note that my hypothetical snail example and the analysis I have given it have real-life
counterparts.  For example, in Rosemary and Peter Grant’s study of Geospiza conirostris
(large cactus finch), it was hypothesized that under dry conditions, “relatively long-billed
birds should have been at a selective disadvantage because the foods they are best able to
exploit, the fruits and flowers of Opuntia, become scarce.  Relatively deep-beaked birds
should have been at a selective advantage because the resources best exploited with a
deep-beak, arthropods beneath bark and in the tissues of hardened, dead Opuntia pads,
become relatively common” (Grant and Grant 1989, 220).  Indeed, it was found that,
“birds of both sexes with short bills survived best in the early phase of a long dry period
when Opuntia flora resources declined.  Birds with deep beaks were favored at a later
stage when there was little food other than arthropods beneath bark and in Opuntia pads”
(Grant and Grant 1989, 227).
To put these findings in the terms used above, at the beginning of the long dry period,
physical differences (shorter bills) were causally relevant to differences in reproductive
success.  Towards the end of the dry period, the process changed: physical differences
(deeper beaks) were causally relevant to differences in reproductive success.  In other
words, during a dry spell, there were two consecutive selective processes occurring,
where there was first discriminate parent sampling for finches with shorter bills, and then
for finches with longer beaks.
In addition to these selective processes, Grant and Grant speculate that there was
probably random drift, in the form of a bottleneck, occurring in the population:
“Conditions are right for occasional, extreme reductions in local neighborhood size.
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Under these conditions random effects on allele frequencies may be very important.  A
population or subpopulation passes through a bottleneck in which alleles are lost through
drift” (Grant and Grant 1989, 232).  This quote implies both random drift processes and
outcomes, but for the moment, we will focus on the process alone.  Fluctuations in the
environment caused periodic, drastic reductions in the size of the population – reductions
in which physical differences between finches were causally irrelevant to any differences
in reproductive success.  Thus, natural selection and random drift, conceived as
processes, are distinguishable within the finch population.
What about random drift and natural selection conceived as outcomes – can they be
distinguished?  If my snail example involves both natural selection and random drift
processes, then the question remains as to which outcome has prevailed.  Here is where I
think we run into difficulty.  One way that biologists commonly answer the question is to
say that natural selection has prevailed if 4Nes >> 1, whereas random drift has prevailed if
4Nes << 1, where Ne is the effective population size and s is the selection coefficient
(Futuyma 1986, 173).  In other words, when the effective population is large and/or the
selection coefficient is high, selection tends to prevail.  When the effective population is
small and/or the selection coefficient is low, random drift tends to prevail.  This rule of
thumb implies that there is a continuum of outcomes between random drift and natural
selection, suggesting that with regard to outcomes Beatty is correct: random drift and
natural selection are not distinct.7  Furthermore, the rule of thumb leaves us with at least
two lingering concerns.  First, since it is purely theoretical, it does not address the
question of which process actually prevailed to produce the outcome (if indeed such a
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question can be answered).  Second, it does not address the question as to what x ent
each process has contributed to the overall outcome (and again, it is not clear that this
question can be answered).
Hodge (personal communication) has suggested that although it may be difficult to
determine whether one particular outcome – say, a 10% increase in type A over type a –
is due to random drift process or a natural selection process (since either random drift or
natural selection can produce such an outcome), it may be possible to determine whether
a series of outcomes is due to random drift or natural selection.  More specifically, Hodge
suggests that a consistent and repeatable increase of A over a is evidence for selection, so
that the series of outcomes serves as evidence of the process.
Surely, this is correct, but it raises further questions.  How consistent must the
increases be?  How repeatable must they be?  With regard to consistency, as we saw
above, sometimes natural selection can lead to an unexpected outcome, which in this case
would be a decrease in A over a.  Clearly, we would want not one decrease to rule out
natural selection; so, for a series of outcomes, what percentage of outcomes may be
decreases for it still to be considered natural selection?  With regard to repeatability, it is
not unlikely for random drift to produce a “streak of good luck” – an increase of one type
over another for a number of generations (Millstein 2000a).  Apparent directionality does
not rule out random drift.  So, while it is true that the more consistent and the more
repeatable that a series of outcomes is, the more likely it is to be natural selection, there
may be series of outcomes which cannot clearly be described as natural selection and
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random drift.8  All of which is to say that as outcomes, random drift and natural selection
cannot always be distinguished (a point on which Hodge and I agree).
If the points I have argued for above can be granted, there are two possible
conclusions that can be drawn.  The obvious, straightforward conclusion is to accept that
although random drift and natural selection can be distinguished when they are conceived
as processes, they cannot be distinguished fully when they are conceived as outcomes.
This conclusion accepts most of the current usages of the terms “natural selection” and
“random drift” – that sometimes, when one says “natural selection” or “random drift”,
one refers to the processes, whereas other times, one refers to the outcomes.  Clearly,
however, the status quo paves the way for the kinds of problems discussed above, where
process is confused with outcome.
An alternative, somewhat more normative conclusion proposes that this entire
discussion of outcomes really should not be part of a discussion of concepts.  Rather,
outcomes – the results for particular populations undergoing the processes of natural
selection and/or random drift – should more properly considered to be part of an
empirical discussion, not a conceptual discussion.  In other words, when we look at a
particular population and ask whether a particular change was due to random drift or
natural selection (or to what extent the change was due to random drift and to what extent
the change was due to natural selection), we are really asking an empirical, not a
conceptual question.  The normative conclusion proposes a change in our language usage
– that when we say “natural selection” or “random drift,” that we refer to the processes,
and that when we want to refer to the outcomes of those processes, we say “the results of
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natural selection (random drift)” or “natural selection (random drift) outcomes”, or the
like.  The normative conclusion thus asserts that, as a conceptual matter, natural selection
and random drift are distinct, but that as an empirical matter, their outcomes are difficult
to distinguish.9
I would urge the “normative” conclusion over the “obvious” conclusion, although the
less normative among us would clearly prefer the latter.  Indeed, I recognize that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to change widespread terminological usages.  And yet if we
do not, I fear that further confusion will be the result.
3.2. An Alternative Solution to the Problem.
As noted above, my position is essentially the same as Hodge’s (1987; see also Hodge
1983).  However, there are other possible responses to the problem that Beatty raises.
For example, Shanahan (1992) argues that conceptually, random drift and natural
selection are the ends of a continuum.  However, to reach this conclusion, Shanahan must
reject heritability as a necessary condition for natural selection.  As Endler has argued,
this has the effect of trivializing natural selection to the claim that “there are differences
among different phenotypes” (Endler 1992, 223).  For Rosenberg, the problem is non-
existent, since according to Rosenberg, random drift is eliminable from an omniscient
account of evolutionary theory (1988), a claim challenged by Millstein (1996).  A fifth
potential solution10 is implicit in Brandon and Carson (1996) and Sober (1984).  It is to
that alternative that I now turn.
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Brandon and Carson state: “Conceptually (though often not empirically) drift and
natural selection are clearly distinct” (1996, 325, n. 13).  This is essentially the
conclusion for which I argued above.  Brandon and Carson do not offer reasons for this
conclusion, but they seem to be relying on a conception of natural selection that is
different from Beatty’s (or at least different from my interpretation of Beatty11).  On
Beatty’s account, which I have largely endorsed (it is his conclusions that I disagree
with), both natural selection and random drift are represented as sampling processes, and
both are probabilistic.12  More specifically, the theory of natural selection incorporates
probabilities independent of the probabilities that the theory of random drift incorporates.
This contrasts with the account offered by Brandon and Carson (1996, 324), in which the
formal structure of theory of natural selection is “deterministic” in the sense that Sober
elaborates: “When it acts alone, the future frequencies of traits in a population are
logically implied by their starting frequencies and the fitness values of the various
genotypes” (Sober 1984, 110; italics in original).  Thus, according to Brandon and
Carson, the probabilism of natural selection derives solely from its real-life connection
with drift: “natural selection is indeterministic at the population level because (in real
life as opposed to certain formal models) it is inextricably connected with random drift”
(1996, 324; italics in original).  The theory of natural selection, on Brandon and Carson’s
account, is itself not probabilistic, even if in “real life” the phenomenon always is.
Given this account of natural selection, it seems clear why Brandon and Carson reject
Beatty’s claim that random drift and natural selection cannot be conceptually
distinguished.  In the case of Beatty’s moth example, Brandon and Carson would claim
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that the population experienced both natural selection and random drift.  They would
argue that to the extent that the change in the population was in accordance with the
expectations of natural selection, the change was due to natural selection, whereas to the
extent that the change deviated from those expectations, the change was due to random
drift.  On this kind of view, the concepts of random drift and natural selection are distinct;
natural selection is a process whereby organisms achieve their expected reproductive
success (based on their fitness in a given environment), random drift is a process which
probabilistically deviates the population from those expectations.
This argument is appealing in that it provides a clean distinction between natural
selection and random drift.  It also supports the oft-repeated claim that in most real
populations, both natural selection and random drift are occurring; using Brandon and
Carson’s conceptions of random drift and natural selection, natural selection will always
occur with random drift (since no real population is infinite).
However, the argument makes the same mistake we saw above: it fails to distinguish
processes from outcomes.  This failure derives from Brandon and Carson’s conceptions
of random drift and natural selection.  Brandon and Carson state that drift can be modeled
after the drawing of balls from an urn, in which “each ball in the urn has an equal
probability of being pulled” (1996, 324).  With natural selection, on the other hand,
different balls have different chances of being pulled: “some balls are sticky, and some
slippery, with the sticky ones more likely being pulled” (Brandon and Carson 1996, 324).
This is a very nice way of illustrating the difference between random drift and natural
selection as processes, with the former being an indiscriminate sampling process and the
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latter being a discriminate sampling process.  Yet, in Brandon and Carson’s example in
the same section, random drift and natural selection are spoken of as outc mes.  Ten balls
are chosen from an urn of 10,000 balls, half of which are sticky and half of which are
slippery, with the sticky balls twice as likely to be chosen as the slippery.  The expected
outcome is that 6 2/3 sticky balls and 3 1/3 slippery balls will be chosen, but of course,
such an outcome cannot obtain.  So, Brandon and Carson ask us to suppose that six sticky
balls and four slippery balls are chosen.  They then state: “This result [read: outcome]
deviates from the expected result and this deviation is drift” (1996, 325).  But, regardless
of outcome, why should we consider this example to model drift in any way?  It does not
describe an indiscriminate sampling process; it describes a discriminate sampling
process.  There is thus an inherent contradiction in Brandon and Carson’s conceptions of
random drift and natural selection; the “process” conception describes the “deviation”
(indeed, the whole example) as natural selection, whereas the “outcome” conception
describes the “deviation” as random drift.  The proper conclusion to reach, given that the
ball drawing is a discriminate sampling process, is that the model describes natural
selection alone.  Furthermore, natural selection outcomes should be modeled
probabilistically.  The alternative is to abandon the conceptions of random drift and
natural selection as processes, and to define them solely in terms of their outcomes.
However, this does not seem to be a very palatable solution, given the usefulness of the
discriminate and indiscriminate sampling models.
Furthermore, excluding chance from our conception of natural selection (as Brandon
and Carson do) does not seem to fit with longstanding usage of the term in biology.
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Darwin, in describing natural selection, asserts: “But if variations useful to any organic
being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of
being preserved in the struggle for life” ([1859] 1964, 127; italics added.  See also e.g.,
pp. 61, 81).  Darwin’s theory lacked the concept of random drift.  Thus, on Darwin’s
conception of natural selection, chance – in this case the chance that organisms’
possessing useful variations may not be successful – is part of the concept of natural
selection, not separate from it.  Ernst Mayr also utilizes a probabilistic conception of
natural selection, distinct from the probabilism imparted by random drift:
Natural selection is a statistical phenomenon; it means merely that the better
genotype has a ‘better chance of surviving’ (Darwin).  A light-colored individual in
a species of moth with industrial melanism may survive in a sooty area and
reproduce, but its chances of doing so are far less than those of a blackish,
cryptically colored individual.  It happens not infrequently in nature that, for one
reason or another, a superior individual fails to reproduce while an inferior one does
so abundantly … Natural selection, being a statistical phenomenon, is not
deterministic; its effects are not rigorously predictable (1970, 107-8).13
In more recent writings, he asserts that “selection and chance are not two mutually
exclusive alternatives…there are stochastic perturbations (“chance events”) during every
stage of the selection process” (1983, 332).
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The conception of natural selection inherent in these quotes from Darwin and Mayr is
one which many biologists and philosophers of biology would grant, I think: we
acknowledge that natural selection is a process where organisms may not be as
reproductively successful as one would expect, based upon their traits – they may “by
chance” fail to achieve that success.  But is random drift this chance element or is the
chance element an inherent part of natural selection?  Or, to shift the burden of proof to
Brandon and Carson, why speak of natural selection as “deterministic”?  I think the
reason natural selection is often described in this way is to provide a relatively simple
model that can be analyzed quantitatively.  In the context of population genetics, it is
easiest to deal with a model of natural selection where population size is infinite and
expected values are realized.  Then, when one “complicates” the model by introducing
finite population size, random drift suddenly comes into play.  Further “complications,”
such as migration and mutation, can also be added to the model.  So the population
models serve as step-wise descriptions of evolutionary processes, with increasing
complexity.  Considering natural selection under the conditions of an infinite population
allows biologists to isolate better the role that oth r factors play, such dominant and
recessive genes, without complicating factors “getting in the way.”
However, our need for simplicity should not override our need for conceptual
explanatory power.  Natural selection as discriminate sampling reveals processes that
occur in the real world, as does random drift as indiscriminate sampling (for example,
instances of discriminate and indiscriminate parent sampling and of the bottleneck
effect).  We can use models that fail to map onto the real world, if we find them useful,
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but we should be careful not to confuse them with their more legitimate real-world
cousins.
4. Conclusion.
The neutralist/selectionist debate rages on, with no obvious resolution in sight (see Ridley
1996 for discussion).  However, at the very least, it is important to be clear on the terms
of the debate.  Beatty’s arguments imply that disputants are (at least sometimes) arguing
over nothing, for how can one argue over the prevalence of natural selection and random
drift when the two concepts cannot even be distinguished?  Brandon and Carson provide
a coherent way to avoid this unpalatable conclusion, but at the expense of the richness of
the concepts themselves.  Natural selection is stripped of its probabalistic character
altogether, while random drift becomes a mathematical deviation from the expectations
of natural selection (rather than seeing it as a process in its own right).
However, the real problem with both of these accounts is that they confuse process
with outcome, and therefore, draw the wrong conclusions.  Natural selection and random
drift are sometimes spoken of as processes, and sometimes spoken of as outcomes.  This
ambiguity in meaning leads to confusion when we try to distinguish one concept from
another, and it has no doubt created confusion in other areas of evolutionary thinking as
well.  But process is not the same as outcome, and so we should be careful to identify
clearly when we are speaking of the process itself, and when we are speaking of its
outcome.  Random drift as a process can be distinguished from natural selection as a
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process, even though random drift as an outcome may not be always be distinguishable
from natural selection as an outcome.  If we cannot distinguish random drift outcomes
from natural selection outcomes, which is more properly an empirical consideration than
it is a conceptual consideration, the neutralist/selectionist debate may never be resolved,
but at least it will not have been over nothing.
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Notes
1 As far as I know, the terms “gamete sampling” and “parent sampling” were first
used in Beatty (1984), although he does not make use of this terminology in his 1992
paper.
2 Throughout this paper, I will speak primarily of “physical differences” rather than
“fitness differences” in order to avoid entanglement in the question of how to define
fitness, a question that is largely irrelevant to the question at hand.
3 Of course, the fittest organisms may not have the greatest reproductive success;
here we describe only a possible outcome (see discussion below).  Similarly, with the
process of random drift the outcome may not be that gene frequencies fluctuate from
generation to generation; in a large population, gene frequencies may remain relatively
constant.
4 I will question this suggestion below.
5 The proposition I am asserting (here, and throughout the essay) concerns the
structure of theory only.  For a discussion of the “probabilistic nature” of the p ocess
(i.e., for a discussion of the question of whether the evolutionary process is
indeterministic) see Rosenberg (1988, 1994), Horan (1994), and Graves, Horan, and
Rosenberg (1999), all of whom argue that the evolutionary process is deterministic, and
Brandon and Carson (1996), who argue that the evolutionary process is indeterministic.
My own position is that given our current state of scientific knowledge, we are currently
not in a position to answer this question, and thus, we should remain agnostic (Millstein
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2000b).  Therefore, the arguments I present in this paper should hold whether the
evolutionary process is deterministic or indeterministic.
6 Or as being cases of random drift alone, if there are no causally relevant physical
differences in the population at all.
7 In the finch study, Grant and Grant attribute the outcome largely to natural
selection, although their conclusions are by their own admission somewhat less than
definitive (Grant and Grant 1989, 233).
8 I don’t want to rule out the possibility of using probability theory or some other
means to specify “consistency” and “repeatability” more precisely, but only to suggest
that the problem of distinguishing outcomes is more complex than that of distinguishing
processes, and that some outcomes may not be identifiable as natural selection or random
drift.
9 This issue deserves more discussion than I am able to give it here.  For further
discussion of the difficulties involved in distinguishing between natural selection and
random drift empirically, see Beatty (1987).
10The five potential solutions are those of: 1) Beatty, 2) Hodge/Millstein 3)
Shanahan, 4) Rosenberg, and 5) Brandon/Carson/Sober.
11 If I am mistaken, and if Beatty’s conception of natural selection is the same as
Brandon and Carson’s, then it is unclear how to make sense of Beatty’s claim that it is
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difficult to distinguish between the concepts of random drift and natural selection (as will
become evident from the discussion below).
12 Again, I am not arguing for the indeterminism of the process of natural selection;
in this section I am making only a much weaker claim concerning the probabilistic
structure of the theory (see note 5).
13 Mayr is clearly not considering random drift here; he brings random drift and other
forms of drift into his account at a later point in the chapter (1970, 120-8).
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